Talk:Bradley Fighting Vehicle

25mm taking out Iraqi T-72s?

The wikipedia article claims that the 25mm gun of the bradley can take out T-72s at close range, yet the cited link doesn't really support that. It states that M2 bradley took out some T-72s (without specifying how), there's nothing baout "at close range" either. The linked article does mention the APDS rounds as a secret to its success, but its not explicit (and quite dubious) that this refers to the success against the T-72s, and not say... BMPs and T-55s...31.164.58.229 (talk) 14:59, 6 July 2019 (UTC)

Yes, it's not super clear from the source. Fixed. Schierbecker (talk) 22:06, 24 January 2023 (UTC)

Disastrously spread out

I do not understand why the M2 and even the M3 have their own pages, which are forced to repeat a lot of the information contained here, and which do not circle back to the more detailed development history on this page. I propose to bring everything back to this page. Podlesok86 (talk) 07:43, 1 January 2023 (UTC)

Personally agree, the M2 and M3 have minor differences but having them spread out in two pages not only spreads out editors but as well as readers. JebKermun (talk) 10:13, 23 May 2024 (UTC)

The differences are more than just minor. They're both doctrinally used for a different purpose, and substantially different in capabilities. In general, it's preferable to have multiple pages if there's sufficient information to support them, rather than cluttering everything up into one overstuffed location that becomes too long and unwieldy. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 17:44, 11 December 2024 (UTC)

The number of vehicles to be delivered to Ukraine

With regards to this, the current info is that the US is sending 59 BFVs to Ukraine, in addition to 50 that were announced previously[1]. If there is no additional info, it should be routine calculation to say the US is delivering 109 BFVs. If not, please include both numbers. I think the IP editor was doing a calculation based on the two press releases. Politrukki (talk) 21:52, 24 January 2023 (UTC)

Ah, the number was already fixed, with even better source, while I was typing. Politrukki (talk) 21:56, 24 January 2023 (UTC)

I've added a citation to Reuters for the 109 figure. It's not super obvious from the press release whether the 59 is in addition to the 50 already sent. Schierbecker (talk) 21:59, 24 January 2023 (UTC)

Cost of the project citation?

Citation 30 states the project cost was $5.7 billion for 6700+ vehicles at 3.2 million a piece. Simple math states the production costs alone are over 51 billion, let alone the development cost. The citations website own citations don't list any prices. Where are these numbers coming from? Either they're wrong or their meaning is ambiguous. 132.175.114.39 (talk) 16:00, 11 December 2024 (UTC)

Citation 30 was written in 2000, for a program size of 1602 units. This is why you cannot just use "simple math" to extrapolate a number. If you have a reliable source with updated program costs, we can include it. ⇒SWATJester ^{Shoot Blues, Tell VileRat!} 17:42, 11 December 2024 (UTC)

Minor Addition to Bradley Fighting Vehicle History: Personal Account

Account of an officer with 1st Battalion, 41st Ifantry M. Curtis LeMay (talk) 12:30, 24 February 2025 (UTC) Minor Addition to Bradley History

My name is M. Curtis LeMay. When the Bradley was delivered to the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry at Fort Hood in 1983, I was the Executive Officer of Company A. Later, I oversaw Battalion Maintenance. The Bradley (BFV) was controversial when it was fielded; under scrutiny by Congress, Ang criticized by Colonel Burton. Our Battalion Commander, LTC Franklin Trapnell, was convinced that the BFV was a major improvement over the aging M113. To silence critics, and to prove the worth of the BFV, Trapnell determined the battalion would adopt an intensive, six month, training schedule ending with a ten-day final field test. During this training period, the battalion trained in the field Thursday through Tuesday, returning to the rear on Wednesday for rest and maintenance. Once the New Equipment Training (NET) was completed, 1-41 continued tactical and logistics exercises in preparation for the field test. The officers and men became well acquainted with the vehicle, its tactical capabilities, and some challenges it presented. Tactically, the BFV more than met expectations. The fire power, speed, mobility, and thermal sights outstripped the M113 in every respect. The one tactical disappointment was the swim capability. The front ramp sometimes collapsed during the swim, causing the vehicle to sink like a rock. Our greatest challenges were in the logistics. The supporting vehicles were not upgraded. The Bradley outran the support units, making maintenance and other support in the field a major challenge. We solved the maintenance problem by splitting the maintenance mechanics into two teams. As the combat units advanced in their mission, one maintenance team would jump forward in close support of the battalion, while the other team completed work on the vehicles that were in the area for service. Using this method, we were able to sustain a 90% readiness rate in the field. There were growing pains with the advanced technology. Diagnostics for the numerous computerized components was in its infancy. The diagnostic equipment often fell short in assessing problems, especially in the turret. There were times when we resorted to changing out components by guesswork until a problem was resolved. Diagnostic equipment improved over time. LTC Trapnell insisted on extensive training at night to take advantage of the Bradley’s night vision capabilities. We found that the thermal sights were excellent. Operating both night and day made it necessary for the chain of command to adopt rotating sleep schedules. This took some adjustment of behalf of the officers. We were accustomed to pushing ourselves through the duration of a training exercise. The extended schedule LTC Trapnell put us through made this impossible. The officer who seemed to have the most trouble adjusting was LTC Trapnell himself. One night, I went over to his headquarters track to tell him to go to bed after he lost his train of thought during a radio transmission. The Battalion XO, Major Jan D. Beer, arrived shortly to take over. Another challenge for us was the vehicle repair of attached units. Armor and Bradley unit would be cross-attached for Combined Arms operations. However, the Army did not think to supply us with specialized tools to repair the brand new M1 tanks. Fortunately, Chief Warrent Officer Villagomez was a machinist. He was able to manufacture many of the tools we needed to repair the tanks. LTC Trapnell’s decision to push us hard was a good one. We learned a lot, and the ten-day test (commonly called ARTEP) was a complete success. The test was well observed, and the vehicle proved that it was capable. This is a personal account of my experience with the early fielding of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle to the 1st Battaion, 41st Infantry in 1983. Minor Addition to Bradley History — Preceding unsigned comment added by M. Curtis LeMay (talk • contribs) 12:38, 24 February 2025 (UTC)